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RE VIlW OF EZZIT D"IZZIOirS 139
cmrt for plaimW was affirred, provided the plaintiff remit within ten days .dl
of the judgment in excess of $1215, said remittance being based upon a point
rit considered i this dAiscmsi.
CORPORATIOI4S-UABILITY FOR SLANDER.
In the recent case of Allen v. Edward Light Co., 223 S. W. 953 (Mo,
App.), the pla*ntff sued the defendant corporation of which he was an em-
Phl7ee for slander, smoa by the pre ide-t of the corporation in the bearing
of another eloyee. Plain" wis a salesman, with authority to make small
dcoatins to customers, and i the ccerche of this authority he gave a pur-
chases goods valued at $1.10. Lefkovits. the president of the corporation, hear-
ing of this donation had detectives i stigate and discovered that the goods
had actually been given 4o the cstomer. The plahiff was called to the pres-
*kent's office, where be was faced by Lefkovits and two detectives, Milton and
Va.eatj Lefkoits and Milton both accused the plaintiff of being a thief, of
having stole the goods and intited that they had papers to prove their state-
men. The defendant coporation insisted that the words, beft spoken to the
plaintiff and not of hbn, were not slanderous; that inasmuch as only Valleau.
an employee had heard the accusation there was no publiion; and further
that the corporation and Lefleovits, stading ta the relation of principal and
agent, were severally liable for their slanders and coald not be jointly sued.
Disposing of these defenses in their order the Court held that it was no
defense to an action for slander that the words were spoken to and not of the
plamdtf; that there was sufficient publication when Vallean heard the accusa-
tions made by Lefkovits and Milton, and the frct that he was an employee of
the corporation was immaterial; finally that the president being the owner of
the corporation was speaking both for himself and the corporation when he
uttered the slander and was jointly liable with the corporation.
ESTATE IN ENTIRETY-SURVIVORSHIP, WHEN APPLICABLE.
In the r I case of McGhee v. Henry, 234 S. W. (Tenn.) 509, a hus-
bund and wife held cerhin tracts of land as tenants by the entirety. The es-
tate in entirety is very shiilar to the joint estate, its important feature being
the right of survivorship. Upon the death of one, the survivor takes the entire
estate to the exclusion of the heirs of the deceased. In the case under discus-
sioan, both husband and wife pershed simultaneously by being burned to death
in a building i Lcansdal, West Virginia. It was held that their being no sur-
vivor, both having did at the same instant, the children and heirs of each in-
herited one-half of the estate. In the absence of statutes to the contrary or any
fact to prove which one survived the other, there is no presumption as to sur-
vivorsbip. United States Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301; Coye v. Leach,
8 Metc. (Mass.) 371; Walton v. Busehel, 121 Tenn. 715. For a full discus-
sion see 8 R. C. 716.
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